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Abstract: Given a finite transition system and a regular predicate, we address the problem
of computing a controller enforcing the opacity of the predicate against an attacker (who partially
observes the system), supposedly trying to push the system to reveal the predicate. Assuming that
the controller can only control a subset of the events it observes (possibly different from the ones of
the attacker), we show that an optimal control always exists and provide sufficient conditions under
which it is regular and effectively computable. These conditions rely on the inclusion relationships
between the controllable alphabet and the observable alphabets of the attacker and of the controller.
Key-words: control, security, opacity, discrete event systems, partial observation.
(Re´sume´ : tsvp)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Institut National de Recherche en Informatique
(UMR 6074) Université de Rennes 1 – Insa de Rennes et en Automatique – unité de recherche de Rennes
Assurer l’opacite´ par synthe`se de controˆleur
Re´sume´ : E´tant donne´ un syste`me de transitions fini et un pre´dicat re´gulier, nous nous inte´ressons
a` la construction d’un controˆleur assurant l’opacite´ de ce pre´dicat vis a` vis d’un attaquant (observant
partiellement le syste`me), qui force le syste`me a` re´ve´ler le pre´dicat. En supposant que le controˆleur
peut seulement controˆler un sous-ensemble des e´ve´nements qu’il observe (potentiellement diffe´rents de
ceux observe´s par l’attaquant), nous montrons qu’un controˆle optimal existe et donnons des conditions
suffisantes sous lesquelles la solution est re´gulie`re et effectivement calculable. Ces conditions concernent
les relations d’inclusion entre les alphabets du controˆleur et de l’attaquant et l’alphabet des e´ve´nements
controˆlables.
Mots cle´s : controˆle, se´curite´, opacite´, syste`mes a` e´ve´nements discrets, observation partielle.
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1 Introduction
Opacity, whose goal is to oppose diagnosis, was introduced in [8] and [4]. Given a system, equipped
with a map sending (prefixes of) executions to observations, an opaque predicate is a set of executions
such that every execution in the set is observationally equivalent to some execution outside the set. So,
membership to an opaque predicate is never disclosed by observation. Anonymity and non-interference
may be reduced to the opacity of suitable predicates for suitable observation maps [4]. In this paper,
we concentrate on finite transition systems labelled over an alphabet Σ, on predicates defined by
regular sets of execution traces in Σ∗, and on observation maps induced by the projection of execution
traces on a sub-alphabet Σa of Σ, modeling the attacker’s alphabet. Under these assumptions, opacity
can be decided although it cannot be expressed in the modal µ-calculus [1].
We are specially interested in cases when the predicate of interest is non-opaque, i.e. the system
leaks confidential information. A possible arrangement is then to augment the system with a monitor,
responsible for detecting when confidential information was leaked or will be leaked unless one halts
the system immediately. Assuming that monitors observe only a subset Σm of the events of the system,
which needs not be a subset of Σa, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of monitors
were obtained in [6]. We want to take one step further by providing a controller that does enforce
the opacity of the predicate by disabling at each stage (of an execution) the least subset of events
such that confidential information is not leaked sooner or later. Assuming that controllers observe all
events and all events can be controlled, sufficient conditions for the existence of finite state controllers
were proposed in [2] (the opacity of several predicates is enforced there on concurrent attackers).
We consider here one predicate and one attacker, but we relax the assumptions on controllable and
observable events. Namely, if Σ is the set of events of the system, let Σa ⊆ Σ be the attacker’s alphabet,
and let Σc and Σm be the subsets of events controlled or observed by the controller, respectively, then
we assume that Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa compares both with Σc and Σm.
Let L(G) ⊆ Σ∗ be the regular language of the system G and let Lϕ ⊆ Σ
∗ be the regular but non-
opaque predicate whose opacity should be enforced by control. Not taking into account controllability
and observability, there is a largest subset L1 of L(G) such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L1 and Σa, and L1
is regular [2]. As Σc ⊆ Σm, there exists a most permissive controller K1 confining the system to L1 and
K1 is regular. Unfortunately, this controller does not always enforce the opacity of Lϕ (unless Σa ⊆ Σc
or Σm ⊆ Σa as we shall explain later on). The reason why it fails to do so is that a complete description
of the closed-loop system may be available to the attacker and new confidential information on the
execution may be inferred from this knowledge. To solve the problem, one might think of iterating the
construction, thus producing a decreasing chain of regular languages L(G) = K0 ⊇ K1 ⊇ K2 ⊇ . . ..
Unfortunately, the iteration may be infinite, hence it may not yield an effective construction of ∩iKi
and it does not show either that this limit is regular.
Our contribution is twofold. For the cases Σa ⊆ Σc and Σm ⊆ Σa, we show that the optimal
opacity control can be computed within the framework of Ramadge and Wonham’s theory. For the
remaining case Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm
1, for which the iteration may be infinite, we supply an alternative
algorithm that computes the limit of the infinite iteration described above. The algorithm works in
double exponential time. We do not investigate optimizations nor heuristics in this paper for our
primary goal is to show that the construction of the optimal opacity control is effective.
This work has loose relationship with the earlier work done by Schneider on security automata [9],
subsequently extended to edit automata [7]. The goal pursued in [9] was to produce interface automata
that enforce security policies Lϕ , meaning that the interface automaton rejects those inputs from the
environment that would lead the system to leave the subset of safe execution prefixes Lϕ. In our case,
the role of the controller is not to confine the executions of the system to Lϕ but to the largest opaque
subset of L(G) w.r.t. Lϕ and Σa. On the other hand, whenever Σc ⊆ Σa, our controllers may be seen
as interface automata, as they reject events from the attacker’s alphabet exclusively.
1Recalling that Σa compares with both Σc and Σm.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 fixes some notation. Section 3 brings back
the basics of opacity properties and it sets the opacity control problem. Section 4 brings back the
theory of Supervisory Control. Section 5, which is the core of the paper, contains our contribution.
Optimal opacity control is obtained whenever Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa compares with both of them. Moreover,
we produce an example showing that the problem cannot be solved in the framework of Ramadge and
Wonham’s theory when Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm. Section 6 is a brief conclusion pointing to open problems.
2 Notations
Let Σ be a finite alphabet of events. A string is a finite sequence of events. The set of all strings
is denoted by Σ∗. Any subset of Σ∗ is called a language over Σ. Let L be a language over Σ. The
prefix-closure of L is defined as L = {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃t ∈ Σ∗ s.t. st ∈ L}. We assume that systems are
Labelled Transitions Systems (LTS) as follows.
Definition 1 (LTS) An LTS over Σ is a 4-tuple G = (QG,Σ, δG, q
G
0 ) where QG is a finite set of
states, Σ is the finite set of events of G, qG0 ∈ QG is the initial state, and δG : QG × Σ → QG is a
partial transition function. •
In the sequel, we write q
a
→G q
′ if δ(q, a) = q′ and q
a
→G if ∃q
′ ∈ QG, q
a
→G q
′. We extend →G to
arbitrary sequences by setting q
ε
→G q for all states q, and q
sσ
→G q
′ whenever q
s
→G q
′′ and q′′
σ
→G q
′,
for some q′′ ∈ QG, s ∈ Σ
∗ and σ ∈ Σ. We denote
TG = {(q, σ, q
′) ∈ Q× Σ×Q : q
σ
→ q′}
the set of transitions of G and L(G) = {l ∈ Σ∗ | qG0
l
→G} the set of its execution traces. Given non-
empty subsets IG, FG ⊆ QG, the definitions extend to LFG(G) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | ∃q ∈ FG, q
G
0
s
→G q} (the set
of execution traces ending in a final state of FG) and LIG,FG(G) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | ∃q′ ∈ IG, ∃q ∈ FG, q
′ s→G q}
(the set of partial execution traces starting in a state of IG and ending in a state of FG).
Opacity control aims at preventing an attacker A from deducing confidential information on the
execution of a system from the observation of a subset of events Σa. To model this, we use the classical
notion of projection. Let PΣa : Σ
∗ → Σ∗a be the natural projection of execution traces onto Σ
∗
a defined
by: PΣa(ǫ) = ǫ and PΣa(sσ) = PΣa(s).σ if σ ∈ Σa, and PΣa(s) otherwise. The projection simply erases
in a sequence of Σ∗ all events not in Σa. This definition extends to (regular) languages:
PΣa(K) = {µ ∈ Σ
∗
a | ∃s ∈ K, µ = PΣa(s)}.
Conversely, given K ⊆ Σ∗a, the inverse projection of K is
P−1Σa (K) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | PΣa(s) ∈ K}
Given an LTS G over Σ and a set of observable events Σa ⊆ Σ, the set of observed traces of G is
PΣa(L(G)). Given two sequences s, s
′ ∈ Σ∗, we let s ∼a s
′ in case PΣa(s) = PΣa(s
′) and denote
[s]a = P
−1
Σa
(PΣa(s)) the equivalence class of s.
Lemma 1 Let Σa ⊆ Σb ⊆ Σ, then s ∼b s
′ ⇒ s ∼a s
′. ⋄
3 The basics of opacity
Consider an LTS G over Σ, a regular predicate Lϕ ⊆ Σ
∗, and a sub-alphabet Σa ⊆ Σ. The alphabet
Σa defines the interface provided to the user for interacting with G. The predicate Lϕ represents a
confidential information on the execution of G, i.e. if the current trace of execution is s ∈ Σ∗, the user
should not be able to deduce from PΣa(s) and G that s ∈ Lϕ. In this setting, the user is considered as
Irisa
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an attacker (A) willing to catch the confidential information and armed for this with full information
on the structure of G but only partial information upon its behavior, namely the observed trace in
Σ∗a. In order that the confidential information is never leaked, it is necessary and sufficient that Lϕ is
an opaque predicate according to the following definition, adapted from [4].
Definition 2 (Opacity) Lϕ is said to be opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa if
∀s ∈ L(G), [s]a ∩ L(G) 6⊆ Lϕ (1)
•
In other words, Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa if and only if
∀µ ∈ PΣa(L(G)), P
−1
Σa
(µ) ∩ L(G) 6⊆ Lϕ,
and Lϕ is non-opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa if and only if
∃µ ∈ PΣa(L(G)), P
−1
Σa
(µ) ∩ L(G) ⊆ Lϕ.
Example 1 Consider the two specifications G1 and G2 of a coffee-machine depicted in Figures 1
and 1, and let Σa = {coinIn, coinOut, cancel, confirm, coffeeOut}. Consider the predicate Lϕ =
Σ∗.full.Σ∗. Then, Lϕ is not opaque with respect to L(G1) and Σa, since e.g. for the observed trace
Figure 1: The predicate Lϕ is non opaque w.r.t. G1 and Σa
coinIn.coinOut for which the only possible execution trace is coinIn.isCashFull.full.coinOut ∈ Lϕ.
A contrario Lϕ is opaque with respect to L(G2) and Σa. ⋄
If Lϕ is not opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa, then it is still possible to restrict the behavior of G so
that Lϕ becomes opaque. This can be obtained by withdrawing from L(G) all words u.v such that
u ∼a u
′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u
′ ∈ L(G).
Proposition 1 ([2]) Given a system G and a predicate Lϕ, there exists a supremal prefix-closed sub-
language of L(G), noted Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) and Σa,
and it is given by
Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) = L(G) \ ((L(G) \ P
−1
Σa
(PΣa(L(G) \ Lϕ))).Σ
∗) (2)
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Figure 2: The predicate Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. G2 and Σa
Intuitively, the language P−1Σa (PΣa(L(G) \ Lϕ)) is the set of the “safe” sequences that do not reveal
Lϕ
2, whereas any sequence in L(G) \ P−1Σa (PΣa(L(G) \ Lϕ)) reveals Lϕ (these sequences are extended
with Σ∗ because, once Lϕ has been revealed, this holds for ever).
It follows from proposition 1 that Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) is the union of all sub-languages L
′ of L(G),
such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L
′ and Σa [2]. Therefore, Op
↑ is monotone in the first argument. Note
that Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) can be empty. In that case, there is no way to enforce opacity by restricting
the behavior of the system.
Remark 1 If Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L1 and L2, then it is opaque w.r.t. L1 ∪ L2, but not necessarily
w.r.t. L1 ∩L2. Similarly, if L1 ⊆ L ⊆ L2, Lϕ may be opaque w.r.t. L but not opaque w.r.t. L1 or L2.
bǫL1 a
a
ǫ1
ǫ2
c
b
bǫϕ
ǫa
a
ǫ2
L2
Lϕ = Σ
∗ǫϕΣ
∗
Σa = {a, b, c}
c
c
L1 ∩ L2
a bǫϕǫ2
b cǫϕ
c
Figure 3: Intersection does not preserve opacity
•
Next, we establish a helpful lemma, stating that if a sequence s belongs to Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then
any sequence in L(G) observationally equivalent to s also belongs to Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa).
Lemma 2 ∀s ∈ Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), [s]a ∩ L(G) ⊆ Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa)
Proof Let s′ ∈ [s]a ∩ L(G), then by definition s ∼a s
′ and s′ ∈ L(G). Suppose for a contradiction
that s′ /∈ Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then s
′ = uv for some u such that u ∼a u
′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u
′ ∈ L(G).
As s ∼a s
′, s = u”v” for some u” ∈ L(G) such that u ∼a u”. Therefore, u” ∼a u
′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all
u′ ∈ L(G), showing that s /∈ Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), a contradiction. ⋄
2Note that this language is not prefix-closed.
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Lϕ = Σ
∗ǫϕΣ
∗
baǫ
L
Σa = {a, b}
b
ba
L1
b
L2
b
a
ǫϕ
ǫϕ
ǫϕ
b
bǫϕ
a
ǫ
a
Figure 4: Inclusion and extension do not preserve opacity
Dually, this lemma implies that if a sequence s belongs to L(G)\Op↑(Lϕ, L(G),Σa), then no sequence
observationally equivalent to s belongs to Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa). In other words, when computing the
supremal sub-language of L(G) w.r.t. which Lϕ is opaque, each equivalence class of L(G) w.r.t. Σa is
either entirely kept or removed.
Our goal is to enforce opacity by supervisory control, which puts strong conditions on the admissible
restrictions of L(G) (due to the so-called controllability and observability conditions that a controller
has to fulfill to be implementable). We will also compute the most permissive opacity control in the
form of a regular sub-language of L(G). Next section brings back a few notions of supervisory control
theory.
4 The Basics of Supervisory Control
Given a prefix-closed behavior K ⊆ L(G) ⊆ Σ∗ expected from the system G, the goal of supervisory
control is to enforce this behavior on G by pairing this system with a monitor (also called controller)
that observes a subset Σm of the events in Σ and controls a subset Σc of the events in Σ, i.e. enables
or disables each instance of these controllable events. Σ\Σc is the set of uncontrollable events. Σ\Σm
is the set of unobservable events. We now recall some basic concepts of supervisory control theory.
More information on the computational aspects can be found in [5].
Definition 3 A prefix-closed language K ⊆ L(G) is controllable w.r.t. L(G) and Σc if K.(Σ \ Σc) ∩
L(G) ⊆ K. •
This definition states that if K is controllable, then no uncontrollable events need to be disabled to
exactly confine the system L(G) to K. Note that the union of an arbitrary number of controllable
languages is controllable.
Definition 4 Assuming that Σc ⊆ Σm, a prefix-closed language K is observable w.r.t. L(G) and Σm
if P−1Σm [PΣm(K)] ∩ L(G) ⊆ K
3. •
Intuitively, K is observable, if K can be exactly recovered from its projection PΣm(K) and L(G).
Note that this is a necessary condition for a controller that forces the system to behave like K to
be implementable. In other words, from a control point of view, when disabling an event c after the
execution of s, then c has to be disabled after all execution traces of [s]m. Under the assumption
Σc ⊆ Σm, the union of an arbitrary number of observable languages is observable. Therefore, under
this assumption, both controllability and observability are stable under union of languages, and there
exists a supremal controllable and observable prefix-closed sub-language of K, that we denote
CO
↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) (3)
3Note that we have given here the formal definition of normality. Under the assumption Σc ⊆ Σm, observability and
normality coincide [3].
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The language CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) represents the largest behavior included in K(⊆ L(G)) that can
be enforced by control. Moreover, CO↑ is monotone in the first argument.
Lemma 3 Assuming that Σc ⊆ Σm, let s ∈ K \CO
↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm), then
[s]m ∩CO
↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) = ∅
Proof Because CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) is observable, this set and its relative complement are unions
of equivalence classes of ∼m. ⋄
Similarly to lemma 2, the equivalence classes of L(G) w.r.t. Σm are preserved by control.
5 Enforcing opacity by control
Our purpose is to solve the opacity control problem stated as follows.
Problem: Show that the set of controllable and observable restrictions (i.e. sub-languages) of L(G)
enforcing the opacity of Lϕ either is empty or has a greatest element and compute this maximal
permissive controllable and observable sub-language of L(G).
In the sequel, we shall assume that an attacker has a full knowledge of the structure of G, knows the
interface of the controller Σm and is able to perform in his head all calculations that the administrator
has made to compute this controller. In particular, this entails that the structure of the controlled
system may be available to the attacker, thus possibly inducing new confidential information flow.
This assumptions are at present informal, but might be formalized e.g. using language theory and
epistemic logic. Moreover, in the rest of the paper, it is always assumed that Σc ⊆ Σm (the controllable
events are observed by the controller).
5.1 Characterization of the solution
We now investigate the existence of a supremal solution to the opacity control problem. To do so, we
consider the set
Cϕ = {L ⊆ L(G) | Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L and Σa,
L is prefix-closed,
L is controllable w.r.t. L(G) and Σc,
L is observable w.r.t. L(G) and Σm}
and the prefix-closed language
CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) =
⋃
L∈Cϕ
L (4)
Proposition 2 If CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) 6= ∅, then it is the supremal sub-language of L(G)
such that
(1) CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is controllable and observable w.r.t. L(G), Σc and Σm,
(2) and Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) and Σa.
Otherwise, no control can enforce the opacity of Lϕ.
Proof If CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) 6= ∅, then it is the union of an arbitrary number of languages
that are controllable, observable and such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. the corresponding restrictions of
L(G). These three properties are stable under arbitrary union of languages (under the hypothesis that
Σc ⊆ Σm). So CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) satisfies (1) and (2). ⋄
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Even though the previous proposition entails the existence of a unique maximal sub-language
of L(G), that is controllable, observable and in restriction to which Lϕ is opaque, we still have to
examine whether this language is regular (or at least, to exhibit sufficient conditions for regularity)
and to provide an effective computation of this language.
It may be remarked that restricting languages to ensure controllability and observability does not
always preserve opacity and the other way round (See Example 2). Thus, in a first attempt towards
an effective computation of CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc), following the classical methodology of
Supervisory Control Theory4, we establish below a fix-point characterization of this language by
alternating the computation of the supremal sub-language that ensures the opacity of Lϕ and the
supremal controllable and observable sub-language.
Consider the operator
K(•) = CO↑(Op↑(•, Lϕ,Σa), L(G),Σc,Σm).
Remark that K(•) is monotone w.r.t. set inclusion. Now, as the prefix-closed subsets of L(G) form a
complete sub-lattice of P(Σ∗), it follows from Knaster-Tarski’s Theorem [10] that K(•) has a greatest
fix-point in this sub-lattice. Let K(L(G), Lϕ) be the greatest fix-point of the operator K(•) included
in L(G)5.
Proposition 3 K(L(G), Lϕ) = CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
Proof We denote Lc = CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc). Clearly, Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. K(L(G), Lϕ)
and Σa. This language is controllable and observable, hence K(L(G), Lϕ) ⊆ L
c.
Moreover, we have Lc ⊆ L(G) = K0(L(G)). Assume now that Lc ⊆ Ki(L(G)) for some i. Then,
from the monotony of K(•), we get Ki+1(L(G)) ⊇ K(Lc) = Lc, since Lc controllable and observable
and Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L
c and Σa. By transfinite induction, it follows that L
c ⊆ Kα(L(G)) for every
ordinal α. Therefore Lc ⊆ ∩αK
α(L(G)) = K(L(G), Lϕ). ⋄
Note that this fix-point characterization of CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) does not ensure that this
language can be always computed by a finite iteration as the following example shows.
Example 2 Consider the LTS G shown in Fig. 5 where Σa = {A,B, c}, Σm = Σ, Σc = {c} and
the predicate Lϕ is the set of the sequences that reach the states represented with squares in G. Let
Ki = K
i(L(G)) denote the language computed after i iterations of the operator K(•).
A
c c c
uu
B
A
cc B
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c
Figure 5: L(G) and Lϕ
In L(G), the sole string that belongs to Lϕ, and therefore reveals it, is c.c.A, which requires to
disable the second event c, seeing that A is uncontrollable. The LTS that generates K1 is represented
in Fig. 6(a).
In K1, c.c.A has disappeared and the sole string that belongs to Lϕ, and therefore reveals it, is is
c.u.c.c.B, which requires to disable the event c after c.u.c. The result (K2) is depicted in Fig. 6(b).
After 2i iterations of the operator K(•), one gets the language K2i generated by the LTS depicted in
Fig. 7(a).
4that ensures both non-blocking and controllability
5K(L(G), Lϕ) is also the greatest fix-point of the operator K
′ = Op↑(CO↑(•, L(G),Σc,Σm), Lϕ,Σa).
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(b)(a)
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c
u
c c
c B
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
u
cc
u
c
c B
c
Figure 6: K1 and K2
(b)(a)
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
(c.u)2i
Bc
c c
c c c
uu
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c c
c B
(c.u)2i+1
B
Figure 7: K2i and K2i+1
In K2i, the string (c.u)
2i.c.c.A reveals Lϕ and it must be eliminated by disabling the last c, which
is done in the language K2i+1 (See Fig. 7(b). But, in K2i+1, the string (c.u)
2i+1.c.c.B reveals Lϕ.
Disabling the last c leads to K2i+2, which reproduces the situation found in K2i (up to replacing the
prefix (c.u)2i by (c.u)2i+2. Finally, even though the limit K(L(G), Lϕ) of this decreasing chain is the
regular language (c.u.c.u)∗, the fix-point iteration produces a strictly decreasing and infinite sequence
of languages Kj showing that the above algorithm may not terminate. ⋄
In the rest of the paper, we investigate sufficient conditions, induced by relations between the alphabets
Σc, Σa and Σm, under whichCO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is regular and one can effectively compute
uniformly from the arguments of CO-Op↑(•) a finite automaton generating this optimal opacity
control.
But first, we establish a proposition that helps to simplify the remaining proofs (In Sections 5.2.2
and 5.2.3). This proposition states that whenever Σa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ, we can reformulate the control
problem in terms of the observed system w.r.t. Σm and a new predicate L
m
ϕ ⊆ Σ
∗
m derived from Lϕ
and Σm, solve the problem in this new setting (thus, under full observation) and lift up the solution
to the initial setting. The intuition is that observing events from Σ \Σm could not help the controller
anyway.
Proposition 4 Assume that Σa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ and Σc ⊆ Σm. Let Lϕ, L(G) ⊆ Σ
∗, then
CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) = P
−1
Σm
(CO-Op↑(PΣm(L(G)), L
m
ϕ ,Σa,Σm,Σc)) ∩ L(G)
where Lmϕ = {ρ ∈ PΣm(L(G)) : P
−1
Σm
(ρ) ∩ L(G) ⊆ Lϕ}
Proof Consider the following languages:
• K = CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc),
• F = CO-Op↑(PΣm(L(G)), L
m
ϕ ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
• H = P−1Σm(F ) ∩ L(G).
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We will prove that H = K.
Let us first prove that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. H and Σa. Consider s ∈ H ∩ Lϕ. As PΣm(s) ∈ F and
Lmϕ is opaque w.r.t. F and Σa (by definition of F ), there exists ρ ∈ F such that ρ ∼a PΣm(s) and
ρ ∈ F \Lmϕ . Then, ∃s
′ ∈ P−1Σm(ρ)∩L(G), s
′ 6∈ Lϕ according to the definition of L
m
ϕ . But ρ ∈ F implies
that s′ ∈ H. PΣm(s
′) ∼a PΣm(s) and Σa ⊆ Σm implies that s
′ ∼a s. So Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. H and
Σa.
Let us now show that H is controllable. Consider s ∈ H,σ ∈ Σ \ Σc such that sσ ∈ L(G). Let
ρ = PΣm(s). By definition of H, we get ρ ∈ F .
• If σ 6∈ Σm then PΣm(sσ) = ρ and finally sσ ∈ H.
• If σ ∈ Σm, we have ρ ∈ F and ρσ ∈ PΣm(L(G)). As F is controllable, we get ρσ ∈ F , which
entails sσ ∈ H as sσ ∈ P−1Σm({ρσ}).
Finally we note thatH is observable by construction. AsK is the supremal controllable and observable
sub-language of L(G) for which Lϕ is opaque, we can conclude that H ⊆ K.
Let us now prove that PΣm(K) ⊆ F .
• Let ρ ∈ PΣm(K). There exists s ∈ K such that PΣm(s) = ρ. Since Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. K and
Σa, there exists s
′ ∈ K, s′ ∼a s such that s
′ ∈ K \ Lϕ. Let ρ
′ = PΣm(s
′). We have ρ′ 6∈ Lmϕ . As
ρ ∼a ρ
′, we conclude that Lmϕ is opaque w.r.t. PΣm(K) and Σa.
• Let us show that PΣm(K) is controllable w.r.t. PΣm(L(G)) and Σc. Let ρ ∈ PΣm(K) and
σ ∈ Σm \ Σc such that ρσ ∈ PΣm(L(G)). Then, ∃s ∈ KK ⊆ L(G), such that PΣm(s) = ρ and
sσ ∈ K(Σm \ Σc) ∩ L(G). Since K is controllable, sσ ∈ K and then ρσ = PΣm(sσ) ∈ PΣm(K).
So PΣm(K) is controllable.
Now, PΣm(K) is obviously observable and we get that PΣm(K) ⊆ F . This implies that P
−1
Σm
(PΣm(K))∩
L(G) ⊆ H and since K = K ∩ L(G) ⊆ P−1Σm(PΣm(K)) ∩ L(G), we conclude that K ⊆ H and finally
that H = K. ⋄
5.2 Effective computation of the supremal solution
Next, we investigate three sufficient conditions under which CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is reg-
ular and effectively computable.These conditions bear upon the inclusion relationships between the
alphabets Σa, Σm and Σc.
5.2.1 Assumption 1: Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σ
Under this assumption, the controller observes and controls only a part of the actions of the attacker,
meaning that it is less powerful than the attacker. Nevertheless, this is a sufficient condition allowing
to solve the control problem.
Proposition 5 Assume Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σ, then K1 (= K(L(G))) = CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
is regular and effectively computable.
Proof Let L1 = Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then K1 = CO
↑(L1, L(G),Σc,Σm). Consider s ∈ K1 ∩ Lϕ. As
Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L1 and Σa, ∃s
′ ∈ L1 such that s ∼a s
′ and s′ /∈ Lϕ. As Σm ⊆ Σa and s ∼a s
′, we
get s ∼m s
′. Hence, as an immediate consequence of Lemma 3, we also have s′ ∈ K1, which entails
that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. K1 and Σa. Hence, K1 = K(L(G), Lϕ), which according to Proposition 3
entails that K1 = CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc). ⋄
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5.2.2 Assumption 2: Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ
This assumption simply means that the controller can observe all the actions of the attacker and
control them.
Based on proposition 4, one can assume, without loss of generality, that Σm = Σ.
Proposition 6 Assume Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σm = Σ, then K1 (= K(L(G))) = CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
is regular and effectively computable.
Proof We first show that Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) is controllable with respect to L, Σc. Consider s ∈
Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) and σ /∈ Σc, such that sσ ∈ L(G). As Σa ⊆ Σc, σ /∈ Σa and then sσ ∈ [s]a ∩ L(G)
and according to Lemma 2, sσ ∈ Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), which is then controllable w.r.t. L, Σc and
observable w.r.t. Σc and Σm since Σm = Σ. Hence,
CO
↑(Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), L(G),Σc,Σm) = Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) = K(L(G), Lϕ)
and we conclude using the result of Proposition 3. ⋄
5.2.3 Assumption 3: Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ
Under this assumption, even though all actions of the attacker can be observed by the controller, only
a part of them can be controlled. One can think that the controller can filter out the requests sent by
the attacker to the system, whereas the outputs of the system cannot be disabled by the controller.
This is for example the behavior of a firewall for Internet services.
It is easy to check that the system of Example 2, for which the fix-point computation does not
terminate, fulfills the assumption of this subsection. This leads us to design a new algorithm.
Using proposition 4, we can assume that Σm = Σ. We also make the following assumption without
loss of generality. The system is given by a deterministic LTS G = (QG,Σ, q
G
0 , δG). The predicate
Lϕ is specified by a complete and deterministic LTS Sϕ = (QS ,Σ, q
S
0 , δS) with a set Fϕ of final states
such that Lϕ = LFϕ(Sϕ) and L(Sϕ) = Σ
∗.
First, we perform the product of G and Sϕ in order to tag the states in which the predicate Lϕ
is satisfied: Gϕ = G ‖ Sϕ = (Q,Σ, q0, δ), with Q = QG × QS , q0 = (q
G
0 , q
S
0 ) and δ the synchronized
transition function. By denoting F = QG × Fϕ, we get LF (Gϕ) = L(G) ∩ Lϕ, meaning that the
execution traces that reach or go through a state of F reveal Lϕ (note that L(Gϕ) = L(G), because
Sϕ is complete). Thus, Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) ⇔ Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(G). Clearly, if Lϕ is
non-opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) \ Σ
∗ΣcΣ
∗ and Σa, then no control can enforce the opacity of Lϕ. So in the
sequel, without loss of generality, we assume that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) \ Σ
∗ΣcΣ
∗ and Σa. In
particular, this entails that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) \ Σ
∗
c .
Under this assumption, we show that the optimal opacity control may be enforced by a finite state
controller, defined by a deterministic LTS C = (Q,Σ,Θ0, δ) with the set of states
Q = {(X, q) : q ∈ X ⊆ Q}
and the initial state Θ0 = (X0, q0) specified by
X0 = {q ∈ Q : ∃s ∈ (Σ \ Σa)
∗, q0
s
→ q}
Intuitively, after the execution of a trace s, the controller is in a state (X, q) when the controlled
system is in state q (recall that Σm = Σ) and X is the best estimate of the current state of Gϕ that
the attacker A can get from the observation PΣa(s) of this execution trace. In particular, if no event
in Σa has been produced yet, the best estimate is X0 (recall that the attacker has full knowledge of
the structure of Gϕ)
6.
6Some states in Q will possibly be not reachable, but it does not matter since these states can be eliminated afterwards
by trimming C.
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In the sequel, we denote T the set of transitions of Gϕ.
The main task, for completing the construction of C, is to determine the map α : 2Q −→ 2T that
tells, for each state (X, q) and simultaneously for all q ∈ X, which set α(X) of controllable transitions
of Gϕ the controller does enable, thus
α(X) ⊆ α0(X)
∆
= {q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T : q ∈ X, q′ ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σc}.
So, in state (X, q), the controller disables the transitions q
σ
→ q′ ∈ α0(X) \ α(X), all of which are
controllable.
Suppose the correct map α has been computed. Then the set TC (of transitions of C) is inductively
defined as the least set of transitions (X, q)
σ
→C (X
′, q′) such that (X, q) is reachable, q
σ
→ q′, and the
estimate X ′ of the attacker is updated from X as follows:
• if σ /∈ Σa, then X
′ = X
• if σ ∈ (Σa \ Σc), then
X ′ = { q′ ∈ Q : ∃q ∈ X, ∃s ∈ Σ∗, q
s
→ q′ and σ ∼a s} (5)
• if σ ∈ Σc, then
X ′ = {q” ∈ Q : ∃q ∈ X, ∃q′ ∈ Q, ∃s ∈ Σ∗, q
σ
→ q′ ∈ α(X) and q′
s
→ q” and s ∼a ǫ} (6)
This is coherent with the idea that the attacker has full knowledge of the structure of C, hence of α.
Lemma 4 Let (X, q)
σs
→C (X
′, q′) with σ ∈ Σa and s ∈ (Σ \ Σa)
∗, then ∀q′ ∈ X ′, ∃q ∈ X, (X, q)
w
→C
(X ′, q′) with w ∼a σ. ⋄
Lemma 5 Let Θ0
s
→C (X, q) and Θ0
s′
→C (X
′, q′). If s ∼a s
′ then X = X ′. ⋄
Both lemmas are immediate consequences of the definition of TC .
We explain now the motivation under the definition of the map α. Let (X, q) be a reachable state
of the controller, thus q ∈ X, and let q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T with σ ∈ Σc. If, for some s ∈ (Σ \Σc)
∗, q′
s
→ q” ∈ F
but σs ∼a s
′ for no sequence s′ such that q
s′
→ q” /∈ F for some q ∈ X, then the controller C should
disable q
σ
→ q′ when in state (X, q), otherwise triggering s after σ will reveal Lϕ. Hence, one should
have q
σ
→ q′ /∈ α(X).
X
q′ /∈ F
q” ∈ Fs
q q” ∈ F
w
∼a
w′
q′q
σ
σ
But now suppose that, for some w,w′ ∈ (Σ \ Σc)
∗ and q ∈ X, q′, q” ∈ Q, q
σw
→ q” ∈ F , w ∼a w
′,
and q′
w′
→ q′ /∈ F (thus ¬(s ∼a w
′)). If q
σ
→ q′ /∈ α(X), and the attacker has full knowledge of C and
the map α, the transition sequence q
σw
→ q” may now reveal the predicate Lϕ, since the attacker knows
that the masking transition sequence q
σw′
→ q′ is disabled by C. Therefore, α(X) must be computed
iteratively as the limit of a decreasing chain started from the finite set α0(X).
The definition of α(X) is as follows. Let T range over the subsets of αo(X), and for σ ∈ Σc, let
Next(X,σ, T )
∆
= {q′ ∈ Q : ∃q ∈ X, q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T}
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then
α(X)
∆
= gfp(λT.α0(X) ∩Accept(X,T )),
where Accept(X,T ) = T \Bad(X,T ) letting
Bad(X,T )
∆
= {t ∈ T : t = q
σ
→ q′, q ∈ X, σ ∈ Σc,
PΣa(L{q′},F (G) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗) \ PΣa(LNext(X,σ,T ),(Q\F )(G)) 6= ∅}
All transitions in Bad(X,T ) should be disabled by control, because they may lead to a confidential
information flow by triggering one controllable event followed by an uncontrollable sequence of events.
Remark 2 The controller C is computed by independent iterations of the operator Accept(X,T ) for
all X ⊆ Q and T ⊆ α0(X). •
We will now prove that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(C), that L(C) is controllable and observable, and
that it is the supremal sub-language of L(G) = L(Gϕ) with these properties.
Proposition 7 Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(C) and Σa
Proof Consider s ∈ L(C) ∩ Lϕ ⊆ L(G).
• If PΣc(s) = ε, then s /∈ Σ
∗ΣcΣ
∗. As by hypothesis Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ)\(Σ
∗ΣcΣ
∗) and Σa,
there exists s′ ∈ L(Gϕ) such that s
′ ∼a s and s
′ 6∈ Lϕ. Since Σc ⊆ Σa, we also have PΣc(s
′) = ε
and hence s′ ∈ L(C).
• if PΣc(s) 6= ε, then s can be decomposed as s = s1cs2 with c ∈ Σc and s2 ∈ (Σ\Σc)
∗. There exists
(X, q) ∈ Q and q1 ∈ Q such that Θ0
s1→ (X, q) and (q
c
→ q1) ∈ α(X). Let (X, q)
c
→C (X
′, q1),
thus
X ′ = {q” : ∃q′ ∈ Next(X, c, α(X)),∃s ∈ Σ∗, q′
s
→ q” and s ∼a ǫ}
Assume for a contradiction that ∀q′1 ∈ X
′, ∀s′2 ∈ [s2]a, (X
′, q′1)
s′
2→C (Z, q
′
2) entails q
′
2 ∈ F . Then
s′2 ∈ L{q′1},F (Gϕ)∩(Σ\Σc)
∗ and PΣa(s2) /∈ PΣa(LX′,(Q\F )(Gϕ)), hence (q
c
→ q1) ∈ Bad(X,α(X)),
in contradiction with (X, q)
c
→C (X
′, q1). Therefore, (X
′, q′1)
s′
2→C (Z, q
′
2) for some q
′
1 ∈ X
′,
s′2 ∈ [s2]a, and q
′
2 /∈ F . Now, (X, q)
c
→C (X
′, q1) and q
′
1 ∈ X
′ entail that (X, q)
cs′
→C (X
′, q′1)
for some q ∈ X and s′ ∈ (Σ \ Σa)
∗ (Lemma 4), and q ∈ X entails that Θ0
s′
1→C (X, q) for some
s′1 ∼a s1 (Lemma 4). Altogether, s = s1cs2 ∼a s
′
1cs
′s′2 ∈ L(C) \ Lϕ. So Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.
L(C) and Σa. ⋄
Proposition 8 L(C) is controllable w.r.t. L(Gϕ) and Σc.
Proof Let s ∈ L(C) and σ ∈ Σ\Σc such that sσ ∈ L(Gϕ). Then, ∃(X, q) ∈ Q such that Θ0
s
→ (X, q)
in C and ∃q′ ∈ Q such that q
σ
→ q′ in Gϕ. Since σ 6∈ Σc, (X, q)
c
→C (X
′q′) for some q′ by definition of
TC , hence sσ ∈ L(C). ⋄
Theorem 1 Assume that Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm = Σ, then L(C) = CO-Op
↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σ,Σc).
Proof Let K = CO-Op↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σ,Σc). Since Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(C) and Σa, L(C) is
controllable w.r.t. L(Gϕ) and Σc, and L(C) is observable w.r.t. Σm and L(G) (as Σm = Σ), we have
L(C) ⊆ K.
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It remains to prove thatK ⊆ L(C). We proceed by contradiction. Let s ∈ K\L(C). This sequence
can be decomposed as s = s1σs2, where s1 is the longest prefix of s such that [s1]a ∩K = [s1]a ∩L(C),
hence s1 ∈ L(C) (because s1 ∈ K), [s1σ]a ∩ K 6= [s1σ]a ∩ L(C) (by definition of s1), and σ ∈ Σa
(because [s1σ]a 6= [s1]a).
Since L(C) ⊆ K, [s1σ]a ∩ L(C) ⊂ [s1σ]a ∩ K and one can find u = u1σu2 in [s1σ]a ∩ K, with
u1 ∼a s1 and u2 ∼a ǫ, such that u1σu2 /∈ L(C). As s1 ∈ L(C) ∩K, u1 ∼a s1 and u1 ∈ K, necessarily
u1 ∈ L(C) by definition of s1. As u1 ∈ L(C), u2 ∈ (Σ \ Σc)
∗, u1σu2 ∈ L(Gϕ) \ L(C), and L(C) is
controllable, necessarily u1σ /∈ L(C) and σ ∈ Σc.
Since u1 ∈ L(C), there exists (X, q) ∈ Q such that Θ0
u1→ (X, q). By construction of C, q0
u1→ q in
Gϕ, q ∈ X, and X = {q1 ∈ Q : ∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u
→ q1}. It also follows from the construction of
C that
α(X) = {q1
c
→ q2 : q1 ∈ X, q2 ∈ Q, c ∈ Σc s.t. ∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u
→ q1 and uc ∈ L(C)}
and moreover, for all q1
c
→ q2 ∈ α(X), ∀u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u
→ q1 ⇒ uc ∈ L(C). Therefore,
u1 ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u1→ q, σ ∈ Σc, and u1σ /∈ L(C) entail that α(X) contains no transition q
σ
→ q′.
Consider now the alternative set of transitions
β = {q1
c
→ q2 : q1 ∈ X, q2 ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σc s.t. ∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩K, q0
u
→ q1 and uσ ∈ K}
Then clearly α(X) ⊆ β (because L(C) ⊆ K) and β contains a transition q
σ
→ q′ (because q0
u1→ q,
u1σ ∈ K, and K ⊆ L(Gϕ)). Therefore, α(X) ⊂ β.
In order to complete the proof, we will show that (q1
c
→ q2) /∈ Bad(X,β) for all c ∈ Σc and
(q1
c
→ q2) ∈ β, entailing that Accept(X,β) = β \Bad(X,β) = β, and hence that β ⊆ α(X) in view of
the greatest fixpoint definition of α(X), resulting in a contradiction with α(X) ⊂ β.
Let (q1
c
→ q2) ∈ Bad(X,β). Recalling that Bad(X,β) ⊆ β and that [u1]a = [s1]a, let u ∈
[u1]a ∩L(C) = [u1]a ∩K such that Θ0
u
→C (X, q1) and uc ∈ K. As (q1
c
→ q2) ∈ Bad(X,β), there must
exist v ∈ (Σ \ Σc)
∗ such that ucv ∈ Lϕ ∩ L(Gϕ). K is controllable, hence ucv ∈ K. Lϕ is opaque
w.r.t. K and Σa, then ∃w ∈ [ucv]a ∩ K such that w 6∈ Lϕ. As w ∈ [ucv]a and c ∈ Σc ⊆ Σa, there
should exist w1, w2 ∈ Σ
∗ such that w = w1cw2 with w1 ∼a u ∼a u1 and w2 ∼a v. Now, w1 ∈ [u1]a ∩K
⇒ w1 ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C) ⇒ ∃q3 ∈ X, Θ0
w1→ (X, q3) in C, by Lemma 5. As w1c ∈ K, there must exist
q4 ∈ Q such that (q3
c
→ q4) ∈ β and thus q4 ∈ Next(X, c, β). Now, v ∈ L{q2},F (G) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗,
w2 ∈ L{q4},(Q\F )(G) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗, and v ∼a w2, so based on the definition of the Bad operator,
(q1
c
→ q2) 6∈ Bad(X,β), which is the expected contradiction. ⋄
Example 3 To illustrate the algorithm, let us come back to our previous example, where F = {3, 11}.
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Figure 8: L(G) and Lϕ
At the first step of the computation of L(C), we get X0 = {0}, Θ0 = (X0, 0)) and α0(X0) = {(0
c
→
1)}. Now, we also have PΣa(L(Gϕ, 1, F ) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗) = ∅, implying (0
c
→ 1) /∈ Bad(X0, α0(X0)), and
thus α(X0) = {(0
c
→ 1)}. Thus, in C, we have Θ0
c
→C ({1, 6}, 1).
Further, for X1 = {1, 6}, we get α0(X1) = {(1
c
→ 2), (6
c
→ 7)}, Next(X1, c, α0(X1)) = {2, 7},
PΣa(L(Gϕ, 2, F ) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗) = {A}
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u
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({1, 6}, 1)({0}, 0)
({1, 6}, 6)
({0, 7}, 7)
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Figure 9: The corresponding supervisor C
and PΣa(L(Gϕ, Next(X1, c, α0(X1)), Q \ F ) = (cc)
+.(A+ cB) + cB + cc
Thus, 1
c
→ 2 ∈ Bad(X1, αo(X1)) and (1
c
→ 2) /∈ α1(X1). Finally, it can be shown that {(6
c
→ 7)} =
α(X1). The other values of α(X) for X ∈ Q can be computed the same way. The resulting C is given
by the LTS depicted in Figure 9 ⋄
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6 Conclusion
Given a finite transition system G over Σ and a regular predicate Lϕ ⊆ Σ
∗, we have addressed the
problem of computing a supervisor C that enforces the opacity of Lϕ against an attacker with alphabet
Σa ⊆ Σ, supposedly trying to push G × C to reveal Lϕ (i.e. to produce an execution s such that
PΣa(s) = PΣa(s
′)⇒ s′ ∈ Lϕ for all s
′ ∈ L(G×C)). We have shown how computing the optimal finite
state supervisor C with controllable (observable) alphabet Σc (Σm) in all cases where Σc ⊆ Σm and
Σa compares with both.
We do not know yet whether the technical answer we have provided to this problem can be extended
to cope with more complex situations, such as for instance the case where Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa ⊆ Σm
(the algorithm defined in 5.2.3 may not give the optimal supervisor in this case), or the case where
one wants to enforce simultaneously the opacity of two predicates with respect to two attackers with
different interfaces. An important question to be studied before applications are considered is the
relation between opacity and finite state abstraction of possibly infinite state systems. Another topic
of interest is the preservation of opacity by algebraic operations of system composition.
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